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Abstract. Projects are often praised for their efficiency, responsiveness to local context, and 
capacity to spur innovation, especially in comparison to more permanent organizations. 
Projects – cross-cutting organizational forms chartered to advance well-defined objectives 
during a specified period of time – have been a staple organizational form in the private 
sector, but only recently have scholars started to evaluate their relevance to governance 
within developed economies. In this paper we explore projectification – i.e., expanded 
reliance on temporally-bounded organizations – as a conceptual frame to advance 
understanding of environmental governance and as an empirical vehicle to incorporate 
temporal scales into a literature that has largely been focused on questions of spatial scale 
and levels of social organization. Through a case study of the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s recently created Regional Conservation Partnership Program, we critically 
assess the concept of projectification. Based on interviews with key policy analysts and 
administrators and a review of policy documents, we critically evaluate prospects for project 
forms to empower local actors, produce new knowledge, and disrupt the policy field. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Projects are often praised by boosters for their efficiency, responsiveness to local context, 
and capacity to spur innovation, especially in comparison to more permanent organizations 
(Gallagher 2015; see also Sjöblom and Godenhjelm, 2009). Projects – i.e., cross-cutting 
organizational forms chartered to advance well-defined objectives during a specified period 
of time (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995) – have been a staple organizational form in the private 
sector, but only recently have scholars started to evaluate the relevance of projects in public 
policy and governance in developed economies (Andersson, 2009; Sjöblom, 2009; Wolf, 
2012; Allan, 2012). The trend toward projects has been dubbed ‘projectification’, the 
“increasing reliance on temporary organisations, typically projects, in order to enhance action 
and strategic effort” (Godenhjelm et al, 2015, page 328).  
 
The aim of this paper is to establish the utility of engaging projects theoretically and 
empirically to advance critical understanding of environmental governance. We argue that 
projectification is consistent with current understanding of governance and the ostensible 
‘turn from government to governance’ (cf. Rhodes, 1997). We explore the potential of the 
projectification thesis – i.e., expanded reliance on temporary organizations in society has 
social, economic, and ecological significance – to open up new lines of research related to 
temporal dimensions of governance. To date, the field of environmental governance has 
grappled meaningfully with questions of multi-level governance, territorial governance, and 
cross-sectoral (i.e. state, market, civil society) governance, all of which imply a departure 
from a simple, state-centered perspective and a concern with dynamics at multiple sites or 
spatial scales. While sustainability invites reflection on the past and the future, little 
theoretical or empirical work in environmental governance has been directed toward the axis 
of time (Sjöblom et al, 2012). We argue that projects provide us with a temporal frame 
through which we can advance analysis of participation and innovation, which we believe to 
be core foci structuring critical engagement with governance. Our aim is not to celebrate or 
denigrate project forms. Rather, we engage projects in order to expand our capacity to make 
sense of governance. 
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In advancing this program of research and evaluating the usefulness of the projectification 
thesis, we empirically assess agri-environmental policy (AEP) in the United States (U.S.). 
Agriculture is the leading land use in the country (Nickerson et al, 2011), one of the largest 
sources of water pollution (U.S. EPA, 2002) and the source of roughly 8% of greenhouse gas 
emissions (U.S. EPA, 2016). We focus on the most recently created federal agri-
environmental program, the Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP), which was 
legislated by Congress in 2014 and implemented in 2015 by the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The RCPP is 
built on the notion of partnerships between agricultural producers and local/regional non-
profit organizations, government agencies, corporations, and universities. Under short term 
funding agreements, these actors cooperate to advance projects focused around development, 
implementation, and assessment of natural resource conservation interventions. The RCPP 
represents a useful opportunity to engage ideas of projectification in no small part because 
AEP is characterized by a high degree of centralized bureaucratic control (Potter and Wolf, 
2014; Batie, 2009). Local farmers in some states and counties have a voice in expressing how 
programs are administered and how federal money is to be spent, but traditions of local 
participation are highly variable across the country. Despite pressures for AEP reform and 
policy innovation over past decades, USDA has retained a model of policy and practice in 
which they pay for and deliver conservation programs to farmers through an extensive 
network of more than 2500 county-level offices all of which are staffed by USDA employees. 
Within this specific policy domain, locally-based project forms have been more or less non-
existent up to this point in time. This empirical case allows us to highlight the stakes attached 
to the projectification thesis and to demonstrate how the concepts can be operationalized to 
advance critical analysis of environmental governance.  
 
The article is structured as follows. In section 2 we juxtapose brief reviews of environmental 
governance (EG) and project governance (PG) in order to highlight correspondence and 
productive tensions between the two literatures. Our review allows us to derive questions 
about participation and innovation that structure empirical engagement. To assess the 
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usefulness of the projectification thesis, in section 3 we present a case study of the RCPP 
based on interviews and document review. In section 4 and 5 we discuss results of the case 
study and conclude through laying out a set of questions that can support critical engagement 
with the projectification thesis and expanded engagement with temporality. 
 
 
2 Situating projectification within environmental governance 
 
2.1 Central themes in environmental governance 
 
The environmental governance literature has been assessed through reference to i) 
globalization, ii) decentralization, iii) market-based policy designs, and iv) cross-scale 
interactions (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). While we could problematize reliance on this 
specific set of headings, these terms usefully summarize a set of important and inter-related 
concerns about the context, substance, and challenges of governance (see e.g. Rhodes, 1997; 
Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Bulkeley, 2005; Heynen et al, 2007). This framing of governance 
allows us to demonstrate correspondence between questions that structure the environmental 
governance and project governance literatures (see section 2.3 below).  
 
The environmental governance literature has shed important light on the uneven process of 
moving away from nation-states as the prime actors of social regulation (McMichael 2012). 
Increased transnational flows of capital, goods, people, ideas, and environmental risk 
problematize the hegemony of sovereign nation states. The opening created by the 
diminished capacity of nation states has contributed to expanded opportunities for exercise 
of authority by supra-national institutions, multi-national corporations, civil society 
organizations and variously scaled communities (Okereke et al, 2009; Schroeder, 2010). This 
destabilization has served to blur traditional distinctions between identities and functions of 
‘public’, ‘private’ and ‘civil society’ organizations. Occurring alongside the push up in scale, 
we observe decentralization, a tendency to empower sub-national levels of government as 
well as non-state actors. Skepticism directed toward the capabilities of national governments 
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and bureaucracies to reduce and manage environmental degradation, and the implications of 
vesting government elites with additional coercive authority, is a central element of the 
discourse of decentralization (Dryzek, 1997). Part of the ostensible incapacity of national-
level bureaucracies to manage complex environmental problems stems from a perceived 
information deficit (Mazmanian and Kraft, 2008). Understanding the drivers and crafting and 
implementing solutions to environmental problems requires in-depth knowledge of local 
conditions and a level of embeddedness in local contexts (Pritchard et al, 2016). A response 
to this information deficit has been to focus on local communities (Dietz et al, 2003), 
municipalities (Lindseth, 2005), and collaborative, participatory approaches to governance 
(Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Newig and Fritsch, 2009). Engaging and empowering actors 
working at local levels is understood as an effective and efficient way to access and to 
synthesize relevant information (Ostrom, 1999). Additionally, involving local people and a 
more diverse set of people is seen as enhancing the legitimacy of decision-making processes 
and outputs (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003).  
 
Critical studies of decentralization, especially within the field of political ecology, have 
reminded us that rescaling governance to lower levels of social organization is not a one-
size-fits all solution to the problem of social inclusion (e.g. Ribot, 2005). The local level is 
not devoid of power inequalities, and the risk remains that certain classes of actors will be 
over- and underrepresented in processes of resource allocation and rulemaking (e.g. Agrawal 
and Gibson, 1999; Cohen and Bakker, 2014).   
 
Governance and empowerment of non-state actors is signified by expanded emphasis on 
‘new environmental policy instruments’ (NEPIs). The novelty of these instruments relative 
to traditional bureaucratic and law-based regulation lies in their reliance on market 
rationality. In recent years, market-based policy instruments have come to be understood as 
‘hybrid,’ signifying the interplay between market, network, and hierarchical modes of 
coordination (Jordan et al, 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Potter and Wolf, 2014). In line 
with the logic of decentralization, the core idea of the introduction of NEPIs is that 
government planners are poorly positioned to gather and integrate relevant information and 
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knowledge. Extending flexibility to regulated entities and allowing them to make decisions 
based on their knowledge of costs and benefits serves to enhance the efficiency of 
interventions. The prominence of NEPIs is often understood to reflect the introduction of 
neoliberal thought into environmental policy (see e.g. Lockie and Higgins, 2007). In debates 
about social responses to environmental problems, promises of speed, precision, cost 
effectiveness, and freedom from political capture have proven powerful.  
 
In addition to attention to movement of authority upwards and downwards, interest in scale 
has animated the field of environmental governance. Because of biophysical and 
sociocultural heterogeneity and recognition of interdependencies between global, national, 
regional and local dynamics, design and analysis of environmental governance demands 
attention to cross-scale interactions (Paavola et al, 2009; Cohen, 2012). For example, 
Bulkeley (2005) argues that governance spans territorial boundaries, and localities should 
not only be seen simply as vertically situated ‘under’ the nation-state, but also as a node in a 
global network of localities. Similarly, the periphery has been understood traditionally as a 
passive receiver of influence from the center, but taking the notion of cross-scale governance 
seriously enables us to realize the capacity of local and peripheral actions and actors to 
influence the core. Based on recognition of the need to attend to multiple scales and levels of 
social organization, multi-level governance (e.g. Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006) has emerged as 
a core concept.  
 
2.2 Projects as organizing work and practice 
 
The concept of project has been incorporated into a broad range of contexts in recent decades. 
Project management has become a familiar way to structure work in and across organizations 
(Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Typically, a project can mean everything from an intense 
short-term effort to an important assignment. In the project research literature there have been 
numerous attempts to define what a project is, and scholars working from different 
disciplines and traditions emphasize different types of questions. Research on projects can 
be divided into two general streams: a rationalistic tradition that builds on engineering 
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science and operations research, and a critical tradition that views projects through a social 
scientific lens (Söderlund, 2004). While there is pronounced diversity, most definitions of 
projects insist that they are i) limited by a specific time frame, ii) task-oriented, iii) advanced 
by a designated team of actors, and iv) initiated to achieve change or establish novel 
processes (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995; see also Packendorff, 1995).  
 
First, projects embody the notion of temporality. Compared to more permanent organizations 
such as firms and public sector agencies, projects have an end date after which time they are 
disbanded. Second, the focus of a project tends to be on performing specific tasks to address 
a specific objective rather than responding to organizational goals or an overarching mission. 
To carry out these tasks, projects are assigned limited resources – e.g. people, finances, and 
authority – that enable and constrain project activities (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). In this 
sense projects are closely aligned with the notion of ‘adhocracy’ i.e. mode of governance in 
which cross-cutting, built-for-purpose organizations are created in response to specific 
problems of limited scope with the expectation that they will be collapsed, and the resources 
reallocated, when the relevant objectives are realized (Mintzberg, 1979). Third, the success 
of projects rests on relationships among the core team, the assigned group of actors with 
dedicated work tasks and responsibilities, and interactions with stakeholders, actors that have 
an interest in project processes or outcomes (e.g. Tryggestad et al, 2013). The inclusion of 
external actors can serve (at least) two purposes: it allows for knowledge exchange and 
integration between the project team and the environment in which they are working (Bakker 
et al, 2011; Kotnour, 2000), and it serves to enhance legitimacy and acceptability of outcomes 
(Rowley, 1997, page 889).  
 
Finally, projects are ostensibly designed to generate new and unique practices in a particular 
field. Projects are generally seen as focused on generating a “non-routine process 
and/or…non-routine product” (Packendorff, 1995, page 327) that has the potential to produce 
transformative change (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995). Projects are identified as valuable 
sites for experimenting with novel ideas in pursuit of innovation (Sydow et al, 2004; 
Lindkvist, 2008). Projects enable team members, who often are affiliated with quasi-
 8
permanent organizations, to detach themselves from their daily work routines and to engage 
a specific objective for a limited period of time. This freedom, change in context, and 
interactions among individuals with different knowledge and networks are seen as 
ingredients for creative problem solving and learning (Nilsen, 2013). Projects can be focused 
on exploitation of existing knowledge, such as applying existing designs and techniques in 
new contexts, and exploration that yields new knowledge (cf. March, 1991; Brady and 
Davies, 2004). To the extent that projects are vehicles for exploitation, they will respond to 
prescribed problems and implementation plans. To the extent that projects function in an 
exploratory mode, they will exhibit more autonomy, more critical engagement, and greater 
scope for innovation that will disrupt existing governance arrangements. This distinction is 
useful for making sense of the structure, function, and potential of projects in various 
contexts.  
 
Applied to the type of public sector governance we address in this paper, projects are situated 
within programs. A project is a single, temporary organization that is initiated to achieve a 
specified goal. A program is a collection of projects, each of which links to the broader goals 
of the program. Programs may spawn projects with distinct goals and little apparent overlap, 
or projects may be clustered around a set of narrow themes and targets with the hope of 
realizing synergies (Wirick, 2009). Projects and programs are nested levels of goal-oriented 
social action. 
  
It is important to stress that discussing the use of projects in environmental governance is not 
a hypothetical exercise, as European Union (EU) regional policy represents a highly visible 
example of the institutionalization of project forms in public administration (Andersson, 
2009; Godenhjelm et al, 2015). For the period of 2014-2020, the EU has allocated 351.8 
billion euros towards three funds: European Regional Development Fund, Cohesion Fund, 
and European Social Fund. Under this model, each EU member state creates sub-national 
programs based on regional priorities. Project proposals are articulated by groups and 
organizations on the regional and local level, who collaborate to advance a wide range of 
relevant activities including improving water quality and protecting biodiversity. Project 
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teams can consist of representatives from private companies, not-for-profit organizations, 
governmental agencies, and local governments. The duration of projects varies from 1-7 
years, but cannot extend beyond the end of the programming period. The managing 
authorities exercise oversight over projects by enforcing reporting requirements on activities 
and spending. 
 
2.3 Projectification and implications for environmental governance research 
 
We seek to highlight correspondence between the environmental governance (EG) and 
project governance (PG) literatures in order to identify opportunities to strengthen existing 
research traditions and to advance new lines of inquiry applied to the challenges of 
participation and innovation in environmental policy and management. Identifying tractions 
between the literatures presented earlier serve as a point of departure for this endeavor. 
  
Both EG and PG share an implicit reference to departure from a rigid, monolithic institutional 
environment, and they place significant emphasis on the expanded pool of actors engaged in 
contemporary processes of development and decision making. Whereas EG is concerned 
with the expanded opportunities for non-state actors to influence policy and engage in policy 
implementation, PG places emphasis on the participation of actors with different 
knowledges, competencies, and structural positions. Both traditions view breaking down 
administrative and knowledge silos as important, and they share a focus on construction of 
linkages among public, private, and civil society actors. The opening up and the relaxation 
of boundaries/roles that defined governance in a nation state-centered world have given rise 
to concerns about participation and democratic practice (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). As 
with critical accounts of environmental governance that emphasize risks of unequal 
participation of different social groups (e.g. Agrawal and Gibson, 1999), studies of project 
governance have similarly identified unevenness in levels and depths of participation (Munck 
af Rosenschöld and Löyhkö, 2015). Kovách and Kučerová (2009) identify a new professional 
elite, “the project class”, which is composed of those people with the social capital and the 
skill set to profit from governance through projects.  
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Conceptualizing projects as distinct from more permanent organizations corresponds closely 
to the notion of decentralization and polycentrism (Ostrom, 2010) in the EG literature. 
Emphasis on the knowledge and agency of local actors lies at the heart of the program and 
the analysis of neo-endogenous development (Shucksmith, 2010). By virtue of their 
peripheral status (administratively and sometimes geographically), projects can be 
experimental spaces and allow for adaption to local contexts. Projects serve to cut across 
organizational boundaries, and this multi-sectoral and multi-level impulse resonates with the 
emphasis on non-state actors in EG. In both traditions, there is an emphasis on broader and 
deeper social inclusion of local actors (Sjöblom and Godenhjelm, 2009). Integrating different 
actors and sharing knowledge is linked to potential to enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and 
equity. Interestingly, in the EG tradition, decentralization and participation are often 
understood as a means of enhancing accountability. In a world of PG, it is possible that there 
are expanded opportunities for people to exercise their voices, but there is also the potential 
for an accountability gap in situations characterized by freedom from bureaucratic routines 
and controls.  
 
Projectification has close parallels with the proliferation of market-based policy instruments 
within the EG discourse. Because of their short life span, there is a sense that projects are 
well-equipped to bring resources to bear when and where needed, or in a ‘just-in-time’ 
manner, compared to more permanent organizations (Rämö, 2004). In line with the logic of 
markets, project forms are seen as efficient and effective mechanisms for accessing and 
integrating relevant information and resources. This focus on allocative efficiency and a 
rejection of the superiority of bureaucracies in information processing maps closely onto 
neoliberal rationality (Castree 2008; Busch, 2014). Within the EG tradition, the 
‘neoliberalization of nature’ tradition has developed an important critique of market-based 
environmental policy instruments (Heynen et al, 2007). A critical literature focused around 
projectification is largely lacking (for a start in this direction, see Sjöblom et al, 2012), but 
these lines of interrogation are fully relevant for probing the roots and the implications of 
proliferation of project forms. 
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The EG literature places emphasis on cross-scale interactions and the interfaces that enhance 
coordination across levels of social organization. Analogous concerns arise in specifying 
relations between projects and more permanent organizations. Projects are short-term 
organizations that are generally dependent on resources provided by permanent organizations 
(i.e., inputs such as personnel, funding, and operational authority). Similarly, in order to 
catalyze significant outcomes, project outputs must be integrated into the operations of 
permanent organizations. This challenge of scaling up project practices and experiences is 
commonly recognized in the transition management literature (e.g. Geels, 2010). One of the 
difficulties here lies in translating knowledge embedded in projects in a manner that it 
becomes relevant and accessible to a wider audience (Sydow et al, 2004; Bakker et al, 2011). 
The challenge can then be understood in terms of making sense of knowledge production and 
the distribution of effective authority at and across multiple scales (Godenhjelm et al, 2015).   
 
The EG literature has, by and large, not engaged explicitly with time, and this stands as an 
important point of contrast with the PG literature. Temporality is a cornerstone in the study 
of projects (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995), as the ephemeral nature of these organizations 
imparts important properties and offers potential benefits to their sponsors. There may be 
costs as well. The ability to make learning in projects cumulative and avoid reinventing the 
proverbial wheel presents important challenges, and in this context permanent organizations 
have potential advantages. Sjöblom addresses this ambiguity explicitly, as he identifies “the 
tension between short-term devices and long-term objectives” (Sjöblom, 2009, page 167, 
italics in original). Can creation of large numbers of localized projects yield long-term 
sustainable development? This question requires attention to flexibility and coordination in 
policy design, implementation, and assessment (Sjöblom and Godenhjelm, 2009).  
 
Study of projects highlights ways in which the planning horizons of organizations enable and 
constrain coordination and collaboration. Dille and Söderlund (2011) note that projects are 
often situated in multiple institutional environments and composed of multiple actors with 
conflicting time schedules and planning horizons. Failing to meet the diverse expectations of 
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the broader context can consequently lead to temporal misfits between projects and the 
institutional environments. In line with the multidimensional concept of proximity (Torre 
and Rallet, 2005), organizations that privilege similar time frames are likely to encounter 
lower friction in efforts to collaborate. For example, a philanthropic foundation may find it 
challenging to partner with an institutional investor. Given that environmental governance is 
premised in large part on building functional linkage among diverse organizations and across 
levels of social organization, ideas about the relationship between time and organizational 
forms have value for analysis and practice of environmental governance.  
 
This compact review has illustrated some of the key connections between the environmental 
governance and project governance literatures, and it provides us with a tentative theoretical 
basis supporting the projectification thesis. This exercise allows us to identify key 
considerations and questions that structure operationalization of the concept of projectified 
governance. First, attention to distributed (localized), short-term projects highlights how 
governance is organized. In projectified environmental governance we expect to see 
expanded reliance on ephemeral organizations operating at some distance from public agency 
administrators and relevant public sector controls. Second, in projectified environmental 
governance there is potential for empowerment of a broader pool of actors and different 
knowledges. Third, emphasis on local context and adaptability focuses attention on the 
specification of problems and interventions that structure engagement with the environment. 
In projectified environmental governance, flexibility and expanded scope for engaging 
environmental problems presents opportunities for innovation. Our argument is not that 
projectification entails a ‘shift’, as such, in environmental governance, but that it forms a 
dimension of governance that has thus far mostly been unacknowledged. 
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3 Project forms in U.S. agri-environmental policy: A case study of the Regional 
Conservation Partnership Program 
 
3.1 Data and methods 
 
We conducted a case study of the USDA’s Regional Conservation Partnership Program 
(RCPP) to serve as a ‘plausibility probe’; an “attempt to establish that a theoretical construct 
is worth considering at all, that is, that an apparent empirical instance of it can be found” 
(Eckstein, 1992, p. 148). This qualitative case study is structured to develop and test theory 
and to lay the groundwork for further scientific elaboration (Peters, 1998; Rueschemeyer, 
2003; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The case study was conducted between September 2014 and January 
2015. First, we collected and analyzed key policy documents relating to the RCPP 
(Congressional legislation, USDA program announcements, RCPP webpage maintained by 
NRCS). Analysis of these data was informed by the questions we derived from engagement 
with theory (see section 2.3) and from the three dimensions of projectification specified 
below. At the same time, in analyzing the texts, we remained open to emergence of new 
themes and theoretical interpretations.  
 
Second, we conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with USDA and NRCS 
administrators, NRCS program and technical staff, Congressional committee staff, agri-
environmental policy analysts in federal agencies and NGOs, and leaders of projects 
supported by RCPP funds. Interviews were conducted with the specific people most 
knowledgeable of the issues under investigation, based on a theory-driven approach to the 
case study (Walliman, 2006). The interviews were conducted in person in Washington D.C. 
in the offices of the interviewees or by telephone. The interview guide we used to structure 
interactions addressed the history of the RCPP, its organization and implementation, and the 
aspirations various actors attach to it. Throughout the interviews we invited respondents to 
express how RCPP is similar to and different from other NRCS programs of the past and 
present. As semi-structured interactions, all interviews progressed in a similar manner, but 
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allowed for elaboration and focus as determined by the interests and professional roles of the 
respondents (cf. Cassell, 2009).  
 
Based on our theoretical treatment of projectification we rely on three questions to structure 
empirical analysis of the RCPP. We assess i) the extent to which the RCPP formalizes 
reliance on project forms within AEP (how is conservation work organized?), ii) the extent 
to which the RCPP serves to broaden the pool of actors empowered within AEP (who is 
engaged in conservation and whose knowledge is recognized?), and iii) the extent to which 
the RCPP serves to expand the scope of engagement and flexibility in specification of 
conservation priorities within AEP (which conservation problems are addressed?). This 
assessment positions us to assess the extent to which the RCPP represents a new trajectory 
within AEP in terms of organization and scope for participation and innovation. Our purpose 
in this paper is not to ‘measure’ projectification by counting projects relative to some 
baseline. Our focus is on mobilizing the projectification thesis to engage critically with multi-
scalar, diverse, uneven, and perhaps contradictory dynamics that characterize social inclusion 
and problem definitions in contemporary environmental governance.  
 
3.2 AEP in the United States as traditionally practiced 
 
While the conservation mission of the USDA has grown and there are measures of diversity 
at local levels, the ‘format’ of agri-environmental policy in the US has been defined by 
remarkable stability over the past 30 years. This stability of AEP is a product of a particular 
history. In 1985 a diverse political coalition formed and funding was allocated to support 
USDA’s development and delivery of conservation programs to farmers who chose to 
participate. Over time, the mix of programs and the administrative rules of the programs as 
realized in individual states have changed, but the basic mechanisms and the underlying 
political coalition have remained intact (Potter and Wolf, 2014; Wolf, 2014). Conservation 
within AEP rests on funding contracts between USDA and individual agricultural producers. 
Payments are made to farmers for taking land out of production or for implementing 
standardized NRCS-approved technical practices that advance a formalized set of priorities. 
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NRCS maintains offices at the state and county levels. In some local settings, local farmers 
as represented in Soil and Water Conservation Districts and county-level technical 
committees interface with USDA personnel in the implementation of AEP.  
 
In exploring tensions between hierarchical and decentralized models of administration it is 
important to recognize these constructs as ideal types. In efforts to characterize practice in a 
large organization operating many different programs in many different local settings, we 
observe tendencies toward both centralization and decentralization. As Mathews (2011) has 
argued, we should not endow bureaucracies with unwarranted capabilities and coherence. 
The knowledge and the capabilities of central authorities always derive in part from 
contributions of and relations with local actors. Gilbert’s (2015) analysis of democratic 
practice within the USDA of the 1930’s New Deal and the frustrations dealt to champions of 
local autonomy highlight the long and indeterminate history of agricultural and rural 
development policy within USDA.  While the administrative practices of NRCS cannot be 
easily described in categorical terms, over time there is a tendency toward increasing 
regimentation and hierarchical controls.  
 
While NRCS relies heavily on internal resources and capabilities, the agency has selectively 
introduced reforms in response to pressures from inside and outside the agency over the past 
thirty-year period. For example, as is the case in many political domains, there has been a 
measure of decentralization. State-level NRCS offices are more engaged in conservation 
priority setting than in the past (USDA, 2015) and there has been limited engagement with 
third party service providers (USDA, 2002). Secondly, critics have identified conservation 
programs as poorly targeted, and there has been sustained pressure to enhance cost-
effectiveness (Batie, 2009; Doering et al, 2013). In response, NRCS has developed a variety 
of scoring and ranking tools to support decisions about which farmland to enroll in 
conservation programs. Lastly, in response to a critique of the evidence base on which AEP 
is founded, NRCS initiated a ten-year long review of the science guiding their actions 
(Duriancek et al, 2013). Each of these examples of pressure-and-response highlights the 
ability of NRCS to adapt in ways that reinforce the legitimacy of their programs without 
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changing the format of AEP (Potter and Wolf, 2014). AEP and NRCS have proven resilient, 
which highlights capacity to deflect and to adapt in response to criticism and new ideas. 
 
3.3 The Regional Conservation Partnership Program 
 
The Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) was authorized by the Agriculture 
Act of 2014. Funding was dispersed through the program for the first time in May 2015. The 
overarching vision of the program is stated in the following terms, 
 
RCPP offers new opportunities for NRCS to work with partners to encourage locally-
driven innovation and create high-performing solutions, harness innovation, 
accelerate the conservation mission, launch bold ideas, and demonstrate the value and 
efficacy of voluntary, private lands conservation…RCPP provides for increased 
coordination across conservation program activities while doubling resources through 
partner contributions to address resource concerns at the regional level. Successful 
partnerships will bring an array of financial and technical capabilities to projects, 
including cash contributions, technical professionals, and assessment experts. 
 
(USDA, 2014, page 7) 
 
RCPP funds delivery of technical assistance to private landowners by public, private, and 
civil society organizations recognized as eligible under the program (e.g. local government, 
dedicated regional authorities, universities, not for profit organizations, private firms). 
Additionally, RCPP funds can be used to develop technical assistance capabilities (e.g. 
natural resource assessment, conservation practice survey and design, conservation planning, 
and resource monitoring). The duration of the projects varies between 1-5 years. The RCPP 
mainly grew out of experience with the Cooperative Conservation Partnership Initiative 
(CCPI) of 2009-2012, and an effort to consolidate NRCS programming. One hundred million 
dollars per year have been budgeted directly to the RCPP, plus NRCS has authority to spend 
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up to 7% of funds dedicated to other NRCS conservation programs on RCPP activities. The 
expectation is that roughly $1.5 billion will be spent through RCPP in the next 5 years.  
 
NRCS publishes an open call once per year and evaluates the resulting proposals based on 
four variably weighted criteria (see Table 1). These criteria highlight important aspects of the 
RCPP and the structural context of this new program. The partnership model is premised on 
leveraging investments from other organizations. Contributions of money, equipment, or 
staff time are required from project partners during the period of NRCS funding. There is an 
expectation that some portion of projects will be self-sustaining after NRCS funding ends, 
and this reflects an aim to expand and extend impact by leveraging RCPP funding. Secondly, 
there is an emphasis on documenting outcomes. The effectiveness of AEP has been criticized 
by the federal government and by a wide range of advocacy organizations, and this has 
created an accountability gap (Wolf, 2014). NRCS wants to engage local actors to produce 
evidence of benefits. This evidence can be used to support organizational learning (i.e., scale-
up successful experiments and a move away from practices that yield low returns on 
investment), and these data can be used to legitimate AEP. Finally, we observe emphasis on 
expanding working relationships with actors other than farmers and ranchers. This strategic 
effort reflects a need for NRCS to diversify the publics they support through their programs 
and who support them in the political arena (Fortmann, 1990). 
 
---- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ---- 
 
 
3.3.1 Organization of RCPP – How is conservation pursued? 
 
In terms of organization – i.e., structure of decision-making and resource allocation – RCPP 
is unconventional in two respects. First, the RCPP is presented as a vehicle for bottom-up, 
territorial development implemented through projects. Funded projects will bring local actors 
together to advance conservation in ways that they see as practical and relevant for their 
particular region. The RCPP allows NRCS to curate a collection of projects that feature 
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various objectives, geographic foci, and partners. Catalyzing and funding local projects to 
advance conservation signifies a notable departure for NRCS. Funding and creating capacity 
in a diverse array of regional and local organizations is very different from the traditional 
NRCS format of building relations and contracting with individual landowners. 
 
Second, the RCPP places emphasis on non-federal funding. It is expected that half of the 
funding for RCPP will be leveraged through partner contributions, and as shown in Table 1 
project applications are evaluated based on the level of funding and in-kind contributions 
partners bring to projects. Private funding is seen as a way to strengthen conservation, 
generate increased awareness of the environmental implications of agriculture, and ensure 
USDA’s partners are invested in the work of RCPP projects. Some regarded the focus on 
non-federal contributions as problematic, as it might put too much focus on funding, rather 
than project goals and deliverables.      
 
It is the idea of tackling these very complex natural resource issues, but flipping it so it’s 
not top-down, not government-down, not organization or whatever or NGO or agri-
businesses top-down, but from the ground up. Farmers…they know how to get stuff done, 
and they know what matters to them, and they know how to do it at the local level. So 
why not give them the tools they need to solve this at the local level? So it was built 
around that idea. 
 
(Interviewee 2) 
 
 
3.3.2 Actors in RCPP – Who is engaged in conservation? 
 
Analysis of who is engaged in conservation and whose efforts are supported are essential 
questions for assessing the significance of RCPP. In the context of RCPP, the word partner 
refers to organizations such as producer associations, state or local government, farmer 
cooperatives, institutions of higher education, and other organizations with a history of 
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working with agricultural producers. A partnership must include private landowners and 
organizations prepared to work with landowners to advance conservation. This requirement 
distinguishes RCPP, as AEP has been predicated on dyadic relationship between NRCS and 
individual landowners. Providing funds to entities other than farmers represents an important 
shift.  
 
Water utilities are one of the non-traditional partners that were identified as particularly 
interesting from the point of new actors in conservation. These organizations are seen as well 
positioned to support upstream farmers’ efforts to manage land and runoff in order to mitigate 
the need for construction and maintenance of water treatment plants. In the UK (Wynne-
Jones, 2013) and in Latin America (Goldman et al, 2010), there is substantial optimism 
attached to integrating water management into agri-environmental planning and policy.  
 
It was also argued that the RCPP could be important for agricultural producers operating 
outside of conventional commodity systems. One interviewee emphasized the importance of 
the introduction of a financial mechanism for delivering technical assistance to small groups 
of specialized producers. Farms that are part of major commodity sectors featuring widely 
practiced technologies generally have access to technical assistance. In this sense, the 
opportunity to access federal resources through collective action in peripheral regions or 
among actors invested in unconventional products and farming systems represents a way 
forward. Potential for the RCPP to support alternative agriculture and peripheral territories 
was, however, seen to be constrained by the funding mechanism and the contours of the 
traditional policy network. In order to develop a successful proposal under RCPP, one needs 
to have a good understanding of how the NRCS works, how it enters into conservation 
contracts, and the kind of language that is used.  
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3.3.3 Problem scope of RCPP – What is conserved? 
 
Conservation activities eligible for RCPP funding are specified as “[w]ater quality restoration 
or enhancement…[w]ater quantity conservation, restoration, or enhancement…[d]rought 
mitigation…[f]lood prevention…[w]ater retention…[a]ir quality improvement…[h]abitat 
conservation, restoration, and enhancement…[e]rosion control and sediment 
reduction…[f]orest restoration…[o]ther related activities that the Secretary determines will 
help achieve conservation benefits” (US House of Representatives 2014, page 97). 
Interviewees suggested that this list of topics reflects interest in being inclusive. Importantly, 
RCPP does not extend the USDA’s range of conservation priorities, as this list conforms to 
the problems traditionally recognized by USDA. On this basis, there appears to be important 
constraints on the capacity of RCPP to respond to locally driven conservation concerns. The 
RCPP is focused on the development of new delivery mechanisms through which NRCS’s 
knowledge is disseminated in the form of implementation of NRCS-approved conservation 
practices.  
 
What they actually will do on the ground won’t necessarily be all that new, but where 
they deliver it, or who they partner with, or how they communicate to the public, or 
how they measure the success that may well be very innovative…The actual activities 
will be fairly common…Potentially some new innovative conservation practices 
might come with partner funds, instead of using any federal NRCS funds to do it, 
given the complications of all the strings attached in the process. 
 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
Yet, interviewees pointed to flexibility in program administration. While conservation 
practices funded by RCPP must adhere to NRCS recognized standards, there are 
opportunities to petition for an adjustment or relaxation of standards if they do not fit the 
objectives of a project. In this sense, RCPP can be understood as focused on process 
innovation.  
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It’s very broad… And we want to maintain it that way as we implement RCPP…I 
can tell you that here’s our programs that you can use, we’re going to be flexible in 
how you want to implement those as long as we can do that flexibility and we’re not 
breaking the statute…If we can adjust that regulation we will. So that’s a flexibility 
that RCPP is giving us and the applicants and the implementers. But the bottom line 
is we want the applicants and the partners to tell us how they want to get conservation 
done and here’s our tools you can use to do that with. 
 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
The RCPP was identified as different from the USDA’s Conservation Innovations Grants 
(CIG) program, an effort specifically designed to produce new conservation techniques. 
Some interviewees were explicitly critical of the NRCS’s support of conventional agriculture 
and the way that the bureaucratic structure and organizational culture constrain innovation in 
practices. The heavy emphasis in RCPP on generating evidence of benefits derived from 
approved conservation practices points to an eagerness to legitimate the suite of conservation 
practices that have long defined AEP. 
 
4 Discussion 
 
We assessed three aspects of the RCPP to evaluate the value of the projectification thesis in 
the context of U.S. AEP; reliance on temporal organizations, inclusion of new actors, and 
shifts in objectives. By going beyond a simple accounting of the status of short-term 
organizational forms, and asking questions about who gets resources and what activities are 
pursued, we are able to advance a critical and more comprehensive assessment. Because this 
program was initiated recently, it is too early to make definitive statements about outputs and 
outcomes. Through our case study we illustrate how projectification can inform research and 
extend understanding of contemporary environmental governance. 
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---- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---- 
 
Our analysis highlights that RCPP signifies a new trajectory in how NRCS distributes 
conservation funding and positions itself in conservation planning and implementation. 
Providing funds on a short-term basis to a diverse set of local and regional partnerships that 
seek to develop relationships and capabilities to support conservation on private lands 
differentiates RCPP from other NRCS programs and from the traditional model of AEP. 
Under an increasingly centralized administrative model, NRCS has provided funding and 
technical assistance to individual landowners to implement one or more codified 
conservation practices. The design of the RCPP suggests the creation of a large set of diverse 
and distributed organizations that support conservation. The projects can be seen as interfaces 
that lie between USDA and conservation activities. The implications of these linkages are 
not clear at this time, and the nature of the interfaces between projects and NRCS are not 
known. It is unclear if short-term projects will produce long-term benefits or result in 
organizations that persist after the NRCS funding is withdrawn. There is potential for these 
projects to produce lasting capabilities that complement those of NRCS, there is a chance 
that organizations that grow out of RCPP could come to perform some NRCS functions, and 
there is a possibility that these organizations could play a role in redefining conservation 
policy and practice. While future research is needed to respond to these questions, we can 
report that RCPP formalizes a commitment to project governance in AEP. 
 
With regard to participation, RCPP is a vehicle for broadening the set of actors engaged in 
AEP. The creation of a funding mechanism that catalyzes the creation and scaling up of local 
and regional partnerships involving public, private, and civil society organizations is very 
different from the traditional approach to expanding participation. In the past, participation 
has been conceptualized narrowly in terms of expanding the pool of private landowners 
interested in enrolling in traditional NRCS programs.  The ‘opening up’ of the category of 
who is participating in NRCS programs is not, in itself, indicative of democratization and 
normative ideals of social inclusion. We need to know more about the actors engaged in 
projects (cf. Kovách and Kučerová, 2009). Are they small, local entities or large 
 23
agribusinesses and commodity organizations that already enjoy standing in the policy field? 
Additionally, we need to know more about the roles of non-traditional actors. To assess 
participation, we need data on whose interests, knowledge, and priorities structure projects 
and their outputs. Despite these questions and caveats, RCPP is notable for introducing new 
opportunities for a diverse set of actors to participate in AEP. 
 
As platforms for interaction that remove actors from organizational routines and procedures, 
projects can advance innovation by allowing for experimentation with novel ideas and 
practices. Applied to the RCPP, the project proposals must address a set of environmental 
management priorities articulated by NRCS, and the conservation practices advanced by 
projects must correspond to an NRCS approved technique. Although there is some scope for 
modifying existing conservation techniques and relaxing procedural controls, we observe 
emphasis on producing locally effective, efficient, and socially acceptable means of 
delivering existing technical prescriptions. In this sense, our analysis of the RCPP suggests 
that organizing work in projects may in itself have little effect on the specification of 
conservation priorities. Conceptualizing projects as implementation vehicles is different from 
an understanding of projects as platforms for experimentation, and this difference is an 
important element of a critical appreciation of projectification. Referring again to the work 
of March (1991), to the extent that projects serve to exploit existing knowledge, they will be 
focused on realization of efficiency in implementation of existing techniques to prescribed 
problems. To the extent that projects serve an exploratory function, they will exhibit more 
autonomy and more critical engagement with existing problem definitions. At this time the 
RCPP is not in the business of empowering local people to specify conservation challenges 
and to craft solutions, and in this sense the ‘innovation surplus’ of these projects is likely to 
be low. 
 
As highlighted in Table 2, the results of our assessment RCPP as a harbinger of 
projectification is mixed. We document formal engagement with project forms in AEP, 
which is novel, and we identify opportunities for these projects to integrate new sets of actors 
into the work of NRCS and into conservation on private lands. Because the work of projects 
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is designed to be tightly aligned with the work of NRCS, there seems to be limited scope for 
RCPP to serve as a vehicle to change the conservation mission of NRCS. Rather than try to 
weigh and integrate these different results to support a unified conclusion about the extent to 
which AEP governance is projectified, we want to stress the multidimensionality of the 
concept and the relevant processes. Our focus on questions of organization, participation, and 
innovation allow us to highlight ways in which research on temporary organizations opens 
up new opportunities for environmental governance research.  
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to evaluate the utility of focusing on projects, and projectification, 
to advance our understanding of governance. We assessed governance through projects by 
studying the Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP), a new agri-environmental 
policy (AEP) program legislated by U.S. Congress in 2014. The case study allows us to 
explore the significance of expanded reliance on project forms for participation and 
innovation, two key foci of the environmental governance and project governance literatures. 
Our analysis suggests that the RCPP represents a new trajectory in AEP and movement 
toward projectification. Providing short-term funding to support emergence and 
consolidation of local platforms for conservation that integrate public, private, and civil 
society actors is a potentially important departure from the standard model of funding 
farmers’ application of conservation practices. In parallel, our findings highlight that aspects 
of the traditional model of AEP are manifested in RCPP. Although the utilization of projects 
to implement AEP is novel, the RCPP still relies on conventional problem definitions. 
Further, delivering NRCS-approved conservation practices to farmers remains the core focus 
of investment at this time. 
 
In calling attention to projectification and highlighting the introduction of project governance 
into the specific domain of AEP, we do not claim that we are on the cusp of flipping into a 
new equilibrium (cf. Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Policy change is generally slow, and 
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inertia is powerful (Munck af Rosenschöld et al, 2014). Applied to AEP, projectification does 
not imply a clear pathway toward decentralization, relaxation of bureaucratic controls, and 
new opportunities for knowledge production. Expanded reliance on short-term organizations 
is an additional dimension in an uneven, complex, and contradictory organizational 
landscape. In making an effort to understand new developments and trajectories in a policy 
field, history and context are essential. Agricultural policy and the specific programs focused 
around environmental conservation have been subject to many decades of debate regarding 
where authority should reside (Gilbert, 2015). At present, AEP is subject to pointed 
accountability demands (Duriancik et al, 2008), and the dominant response is to talk about 
and to advance more evidence- and outcome-based programming (Batie, 2009; Doering et 
al, 2013; Potter and Wolf, 2014). Building new relationships with local partners and engaging 
them in documenting benefits can be a complementary response. Making sense of actors’ 
interests and motivations in an historical and political economic context is an important 
element of any analysis of policy change. 
 
Rather than attempting to provide a definitive assessment of how much projectification is 
observed, the case of RCPP serves to highlight the stakes attached to projectification and to 
illustrate how the concept can be operationalized to advance empirical research. As we have 
demonstrated, the projectification thesis allows us to derive questions that can expand 
understanding of contemporary governance and institutional change. Attention to increased 
reliance on projects in implementing policy and responding to social problems highlights a 
potentially important development in how environmental action is coordinated and 
orchestrated. The governance literature has usefully focused our attention on the relations 
between state and non-state actors and between global and local actors. Projectification 
presents us with an opportunity to address the roles of projects and the relations between 
short-term organizations and durable public and private sector actors. As Sjöblom and 
Godenhjelm (2009) have argued, short-term organizational forms are related to quasi-
permanent state bureaucracies and to local actors in uneven and variable ways, and these 
organizational considerations present us with important questions about the structure and 
performance of social coordination mechanisms. As our case suggests, projectification does 
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not necessarily follow a clear trajectory toward an ideal-typical project logic. There is 
indeterminacy along many axes, and there is clear potential to layer project governance onto 
existing modes of governance. Future research on projectification would benefit from 
carefully examining the dynamics of projectification and the different forms it can take. 
Extensive private sector engagement with projects and an extensive literature should inform 
research on projectification applied to public administration and governance. Presumably 
there are parallels and important differences in terms of structure, function, and outcomes. 
 
The concept of projectification advances our engagement with temporal dimensions of 
environmental governance. Specifically, a focus on projects provides us with a temporal 
frame or lens through which we can study participation and innovation, two central concerns 
of governance. To what extent does ‘time compression’ (Modig, 2007, page 808) in projects 
encourage or discourage participation, and how do the short time frames of projects affect 
the nature and the quality of participation? Reliance on project forms in governance has the 
potential to open up opportunities for expanded participation of local actors, sectors, and 
knowledges, such as suggested in the case of RCPP. Projects can cut across organizational 
boundaries and missions, and thereby produce new openness, but they can also obscure 
governance processes and sustain existing power structures. Proliferation of ‘pop-up’ 
organizations and appeals to urgency can undermine bureaucratic routines and commitments 
to procedural controls focused around transparency, informed consent, and social inclusion. 
The relationship between short-term organizational forms and democratic ideals such as 
citizen empowerment, deliberation, and accountability is context-dependent. Understanding 
these relationships is an important issue on the research frontier. 
 
The temporary character of projects also raises important questions for the study of 
innovation in environmental governance. Projects have potential to serve as sites of 
experimentation and as platforms to generate proof-of-concept needed for an idea to gain 
legitimacy (cf. Johansson et al, 2007). Applied to RCPP, the innovative potential is 
constrained by funding rules that emphasize a need to rely on existing NRCS-approved 
conservation practices. Further, it is not clear if short term funding will produce lasting 
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commitments and allow for scaling up and institutionalization of promising ideas. We 
identify a need to maintain a critical stance in studying innovation through projects, and we 
must situate projects within a broader organizational context. Rather than characterizing 
project governance as a distinct alternative to bureaucracies, future research should focus on 
relations between project forms and more permanent organizations (cf. Engwall, 2003).  
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Table 1. RCPP proposal evaluation criteria. Source: Based on USDA (2014, page 28–29). 
Criteria (weight) Explanation 
Solutions (25%) Successful partnerships will engage communities at the outset to 
identify the resource management opportunities in a defined area 
and then establish attainable and measurable goals for delivering on 
those opportunities 
Contributions (30%) Successful partnerships will bring an array of financial and 
technical capabilities to projects 
Innovation (20%) Successful partnerships will realize the full potential of RCPP by 
drawing all of the program authorities into an integrated project so 
that resource management solutions are achieved most cost 
effectively 
Participation (25%) Successful partnerships will bring a diverse array of stakeholders 
into a project and capitalize on their unique capabilities to help 
make a project successful 
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Table 2. Comparing the Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) and traditional 
agri-environmental programs of USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). 
 
 Traditional AEP programs Regional Conservation 
Partnership Program (RCPP) 
Organization 
How is conservation 
pursued? 
USDA provides funds and 
technical assistance to 
individual landowners to 
implement NRCS-approved 
conservation practices 
Short-term projects jointly 
funded by USDA and private 
partners develop capacity to 
plan, implement, and assess 
conservation 
Actors 
Who is engaged in 
conservation? 
Private landowners (farmers 
and ranchers) 
Private landowners, local 
government, dedicated regional 
authorities, universities, not-
for-profit organizations, private 
firms 
Problem scope 
What is conserved? 
Conservation problems eligible 
for funding defined in the Farm 
Bill; Implementation of 
standardized practices 
Conservation problems eligible 
for funding defined in the Farm 
Bill; Implementation of 
standardized practices allowing 
for a degree of flexibility 
 
 
